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 TRIAL TACTICS
Is it permissible for prosecutors to argue in clos-ing to a jury that in order to find a defendant not guilty, the jury would have to find that police 
officers lied? The answer is sometimes “yes” and 
sometimes “no.” The fact that there is no rule that 
governs all cases means that prosecutors must take 
care before arguing to the jury that someone must 
be lying. It also means that defense counsel must be 
prepared to object to improper argument.
The Easy Case
It is not difficult to imagine a case in which the pros-
ecutor may argue that it is necessary to find that 
a police officer lied in order to find the defendant 
not guilty. Suppose, for instance, the defendant is 
charged with being a felon in possession of a fire-
arm, the officer who arrested the defendant testifies 
to searching the defendant and finding a pistol in the 
defendant’s jacket, and the defendant testifies that 
the officer “planted” the pistol during the arrest. In 
this case, the only question is who is telling the truth. 
Either the officer or the defendant must be, and there 
is little, if  any, possibility that the two simply had 
different, but equally honest, perceptions of how the 
gun came to be found on the defendant. In such a 
case, the prosecutor would be arguing that the jury 
should believe the officer; defense counsel would be 
arguing that the jury should believe the defendant; 
and the jury would understand that one of the two 
percipient witnesses was lying.
Other cases are not so straightforward. An example 
is United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2013).
The Facts of Ruiz
Two sisters saw a man walking down the street in 
their residential neighborhood, holding a shotgun 
and mumbling. One called 911; five minutes later a 
police helicopter responded, and Officer Peck in the 
helicopter saw from 300 to 500 feet in the air a man 
run around the back of a house and throw a shoe-
box sized item over a fence into a vacant lot. Officer 
Porch arrived at the scene, searched the vacant lot, 
and found a shoe box with eight to 12 shotgun shells. 
Officer Verbanic arrived at the house as Raymond 
Ruiz Jr. was trying to enter through the back door. 
Officer Verbanic ordered Ruiz to get on the ground 
and noticed a shotgun about an arm’s length from 
Ruiz. The ammunition found in the shoebox matched 
the 12-gauge shotgun. The sisters both identified the 
man they had seen with the shotgun as Ruiz.
After Ruiz was arrested, Officer Ludikhuize took 
him to a squad car, where Ruiz waived his Miranda 
rights. Officer Ludikhuize testified at trial that Ruiz 
told him that the shotgun belonged to his father and 
that he had been trying to hide it when the police 
arrived. Ruiz testified at trial and denied making the 
statement. Ruiz was convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm and ammunition.
The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
The court of appeals described the prosecutor’s closing 
argument as follows:
To highlight parts of  his closing argument, 
the prosecutor utilized a PowerPoint slide pre-
sentation consisting of pictures of the alleged 
crime scene, photographs of the witnesses who 
testified at trial, summaries of the testimony 
presented, and visual representations of the 
jury instructions, and of the government’s key 
arguments. Following a slide depicting the 
first element of the offense—“the defendant 
knowingly possessed the firearm or ammuni-
tion”—were three slides depicting alternative 
“way[s] to find defendant guilty.” The slides 
stated that the jurors could find Ruiz not guilty 
“only” if  they found that Officers Peck and 
Ludikhuize “lied to you” and that the Fuen-
tes sisters were mistaken. The court overruled 
Ruiz’s objection to the slides.
(Id. at 1082 (alteration in original).)
The defense objection was directed to the argument 
that to find Ruiz not guilty the jury would have to 
conclude that Officers Peck and Ludikhuize lied. The 
court summed up the defense argument as follows:
At the heart of Ruiz’s argument is his conten-
tion that the prosecutor’s statements presented 
the jury with a false choice between his and the 
officers’ accounts, since the officers could have 
testified honestly, but nonetheless mistakenly 
perceived the events on the night in question. 
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This false choice, he asserts, improperly shifted 
the burden of proof to the defense.
(Id.)
Fair Argument
The court quoted from several prior cases to high-
light when the argument about credibility of  law 
enforcement officers is permissible:
As we have previously explained, “credibility 
is a matter to be decided by the jury.” United 
States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 
1999). To that end, “prosecutors have been 
admonished time and again to avoid statements 
to the effect that, if the defendant is innocent, 
government agents must be lying.” Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is 
also true, however, that the prosecution must 
have reasonable latitude to fashion closing argu-
ments. Inherent in this latitude is the freedom 
to argue reasonable inferences based on the 
evidence. In a case that essentially reduces to 
which of two conflicting stories is true, it may 
be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that 
one of the two sides is lying.” United States v. 
Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) (cit-
ing United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 539 
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the prosecutor’s 
statement that defendant was a liar could be 
construed as a comment on the evidence) and 
United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (“It is neither unusual nor improper 
for a prosecutor to voice doubt about the verac-
ity of a defendant . . . .”)); see also United States 
v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 539–42 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(same); United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 
1120–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Prosecutors can argue 
reasonable inferences based on the record, and 
have considerable leeway to strike hard blows 
based on the evidence and all reasonable infer-
ences from the evidence. A prosecutor may 
express doubt about the veracity of a witness’s 
testimony [and] may even go so far as to label 
a defendant’s testimony a fabrication.” (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).
(Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1082–83 (footnote omitted).)
United States v. Wilkes
The court cited Wilkes and explained why in that 
case it rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
prosecutor engaged in improper burden shifting in 
arguing that the defendant’s testimony was a “pre-
posterous charade” and that “each [government 
witness], if  you think about their testimony and 
what they told you, you either have to believe all 
of those people or you believe Brent Wilkes. That’s 
the choice before you. You can’t believe both.” (662 
F.3d at 541 (alteration in original).)
The court explained that it rejected the defen-
dant’s argument because the case came down to 
which of two conflicting stories was true and, there-
fore, the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible 
inference from the evidence. The court added that 
the prosecutor made his argument after explaining at 
length to the jury what the government was required 
to prove in order for the jury to find Wilkes guilty.
United States v. Tucker
The court also offered Tucker as an example of 
permissible argument. Tucker, however, addressed 
prosecutor argument concerning the improbability 
that a defense theory of the case was credible rather 
than a comparison of government and defense wit-
nesses. The Tucker court summarized a portion of 
the prosecutor’s closing argument as follows:
The prosecutor, in her closing argument, also 
commented on what the jury would have to find 
or believe, in order to convict Tucker. The pros-
ecutor said she wanted “to point out a couple 
of things that you as jurors are going to have 
to find to be true if you decide that the defen-
dant is not guilty. Because for you to say that 
he’s not guilty, these are the things that you have 
to believe. . . .” The prosecutor went on to list 
various aspects of the defense theory of the 
case that the jury would “have to believe,” and 
stated “[y]ou will have to believe that and that 
is not logical. It’s not reasonable.’”
(641 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original).)
The court observed that after defense counsel 
unsuccessfully objected that the standard of proof 
was being shifted to the defense, the prosecutor 
made the following argument:
To find the defendant not guilty, remember, 
you have to have some kind of  reasonable 
doubt. And the key word there is “reason-
able”.  .  .  . If  you are gonna find him not 
guilty, you also have to believe that [lists vari-
ous points of the defense argument]. . . . You 
will have to believe that. Because if  you do not, 
that means that that [sic] the personal property 
in that master bedroom was the defendant’s. 
It means it was his bedroom. It means that 
it was his shotgun. It means that he is guilty. 
You would also have to believe that the defen-
dant did not lie. And do you believe that? . . . . 
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Again, if  you’re going to have a doubt it must 
be reasonable; it must be based on reason.
(Id. (alteration in original).)
The Ruiz opinion noted that the Tucker court 
found that the prosecutor’s argument was “inart-
ful,” but that it was permissible because it simply 
communicated that the jury would have to believe 
implausible aspects of the defendant’s testimony in 
order to believe that the defense theory was cred-
ible. (Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1083–84.)
Back to Ruiz
In Ruiz, the court concluded that “the prosecutor’s 
argument came very close to altering the burden 
of  proof.” (Id. at 1084.) The court distinguished 
between comparing (1) Officer Ludikhuize’s testi-
mony to that of the defendant, and (2) Officer Peck’s 
testimony to that of the defendant.
The court recognized that “Ruiz’s testimony was 
squarely at odds with Officer Ludikhuize’s testimony 
in one key respect—namely, Ruiz denied confessing 
to Ludikhuize that he was attempting to hide the 
shotgun when police arrived.” (Id.) Although the 
court did not say so explicitly, it appears that Wil-
kes would strongly support the conclusion that it 
would have been permissible for the prosecutor to 
argue that either the defendant or the officer must 
be lying about whether the defendant admitted that 
he was attempting to hide the shotgun. Not only is 
this a rational argument based on the evidence, but 
it also is an inevitable one. There is no other way to 
explain the difference in testimony.
The prosecutor’s suggestion that either Officer 
Peck or the defendant must be lying was neither 
inevitable nor correct, as the court explained:
[Ruiz’s] testimony vis-a-vis Officer Peck’s obser-
vation of an item thrown over the fence into 
the adjoining vacant lot was somewhat more 
equivocal. Ruiz testified that, upon observing 
Peck’s spotlight trained on his grandmother[’s] 
house, he attempted to hide because he was 
drinking beers with his father in violation of 
his parole. To this end, he ran around the side 
of the house, where he stated that he may have 
thrown his beer bottle into the backyard adjoin-
ing the fence and vacant lot, but could not recall 
with certainty how he disposed of the beer 
bottle. Although Ruiz also testified that he did 
not throw “anything” over the fence, including 
the “panel” or shoe box-sized item that Peck 
observed, Peck could have mistaken the size 
and shape of the item thrown from his vantage 
point nearly two football fields above the scene. 
As the foregoing suggests, the prosecutor’s argu-
ment that either Peck or Ruiz must be lying 
could well be construed as arguing an inference 
unsupported by the evidence, and thereby alter-
ing the burden of proof.
(Id.)
The point the court made was that it was possi-
ble for Ruiz and Officer Peck both to be telling the 
truth, which meant that the situation was very dif-
ferent from the comparison of Officer Ludikhuize’s 
and the defendant’s testimony.
The Concern
The concern that arises when prosecutors argue that 
someone must be lying is that the burden of persua-
sion is subtly shifted, and that courts must be careful 
to ensure that jurors are not misled as to what the 
government must prove. To be clear, when a pros-
ecutor argues that for a defendant to be found not 
guilty the jury must believe that police officers lied, 
the jury may be misled into thinking that if  it finds 
that the police officers were truthful then they must 
convict the defendant. This is misleading because 
honest police officers may be mistaken, and even 
honest police officers who are not mistaken may 
not have presented sufficient evidence to meet the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Similarly, when a prosecutor argues that either 
police officers or the defendant must be lying, the 
jury may be misled into believing that its task is sim-
ply to decide who is truthful and that this one decision 
will be case determinative. It may well be true in cases 
like Wilkes. It is certainly true that the jury in Ruiz 
inevitably had to decide whether to believe Officer 
Ludikhuize or Ruiz. If the jury believed the officer, 
it probably would not matter very much whether 
the jury also believed Officer Peck, since Officer 
Ludikhuize’s testimony established that Ruiz was in 
possession of a firearm. Whether or not he also pos-
sessed the ammunition that Officer Porch found in 
the shoe box would not have mattered, and thus Offi-
cer Peck’s testimony would also have been of little 
importance, even if discredited.
The Decision
The court of appeals ultimately did not decide whether 
the prosecutor committed error in the closing argument. 
Instead, it concluded that any error was harmless given 
the substantial evidence adduced by the government.
Lessons
1. The Ruiz court relied in part on the fact that 
before making the argument that someone must be 
lying, the prosecutor gave a lengthy explanation to 
the jury of the elements that the government was 
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required to prove and reminded the jury of the gov-
ernment’s burden of proof. Prosecutors may reduce 
the likelihood that an argument that crosses the line 
will be found prejudicial if  they take pains to be clear 
to the jury what they must prove and the burden of 
proof they must meet.
2. It is important for prosecutors to consider 
before making an argument that either law enforce-
ment officers or the defendant must be lying whether 
such an argument is applicable to all law enforce-
ment officers involved in the case or only some. Ruiz 
highlights the importance of  such consideration. 
An argument that either Officer Ludikhuize or Ruiz 
must be lying likely would have withstood a chal-
lenge, whereas an argument that either Officer Peck 
or Ruiz must be lying likely would not have.
3. Defense counsel have the burden of objecting 
when prosecutors improperly make the “somebody 
must be lying” argument. The objection takes on 
force when defense counsel is able to explain to the 
trial judge how the argument may impermissibly 
mislead the jury as to what it must believe to con-
vict the defendant. n
